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Probability matching occurs when an action is chosen with a frequency equivalent
to the probability of that action being the best choice. This sub-optimal behavior has
been reported repeatedly by psychologist and experimental economist. We provide an
evolutionary foundation for this phenomenon by showing that learning by reinforcement
can lead to probability matching and, if learning occurs suciently slowly, probability
matching does not only occur in choice frequencies but also in choice probabilities. Our
results are completed by proving that there exists no quasi-linear reinforcement learning
specication such that behavior is optimal for all environments where counterfactuals are
observed.
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11 Introduction
Consider an urn with 60 black balls and 40 white balls. If we were to predict the color of the
ball in ve draws with replacement, it would be optimal to guess black ve times. However,
psychologist and experimental economist have reported that in such a situation individuals
tend to guess black three times and white two times. Three out of ve represents a 60%
frequency and two out of ve represent a 40% frequency. That is, the frequencies of agents'
responses match the frequencies of the balls in the urn. This is what is known as probability
matching.
Probability matching has been reported repeatedly by psychologist and experimental
economist. For example, Rubinstein (2002) conducts several experiments similar to that of
the example above and nds that probability matching is present in between 30% and 80%
of the population depending on the specics of the problem. Similar results are obtained by
experimental psychologist Siegel and Goldstein (1959) and Gaissmaier and Schooler (2008)
among others. Probability matching seems to be an innate characteristic of behavior not only
present in the human specie. This phenomenon is also found, for instance, in sh (Behrend
and Bitterman (1961)) and pigeons (Bullock and Bitterman (1962)).
In this paper we show that in environments where the payo of not chosen actions is
observed the choices made by an individual who learns by reinforcement, i.e. actions that
were successful in the past are more likely to be chosen, converge to probability matching. On
top of that, we show that if learning speed is suciently slow then this convergency does not
only occur in the frequency with which each action is chosen but also in the probability with
which each action is chosen at any given point. This suggests that the probability matching
behavior exhibited by some subjects can be explained as the result of reinforcement learning.
We also nd that this sub-optimality property of reinforcement learning is robust, meaning
that it is not possible to design an specication of quasi-linear reinforcement learning such
that behavior is optimal for all environments where counterfactuals are observed.
According to reinforcement learning, actions that were more successful in the past are
more likely to be adopted in the future. Reinforcement learning has been found to be one of
the main driving forces of human behavior in decision problems. For some detailed expositions
on reinforcement learning and its relationship with real life behavior the reader is referred to
Roth and Erev (1995), Erev and Roth (1998) and Camerer and Ho (1999).
To our knowledge, our paper is the rst one to explicitly obtain a direct link between
reinforcement learning and probability matching. Nevertheless, there have been previous
articles suggesting the possibility of a relationship between these two phenomena. Simon
(1959) points out to the fact that under a specic class of reinforcement learning models
2the frequency of choices converges to the frequencies with which each of these choices is
the best alternative. Apart from the fact that we consider a much general specication of
reinforcement learning, what we show in this paper is that not just the frequency converges,
but that under some conditions the probability of choosing each action at any given point
in time also converges. To understand this dierence consider a situation where only two
actions exists. Imagine two choice patterns: one such that each action is chosen alternatively
and a dierent one whereby each action is chosen with a 50% probability. In this case,
these two dierent behaviors give rise to the same observed choice frequencies even though
the probability of choosing each action at any point in time diers across the two choice
patterns.
Other relevant papers indicating the possibility of a relationship between reinforcement
learning and probability matchings are those of B orgers and Sarin (2000) and Erev and
Barron (2005). B orgers and Sarin nd that probability matching can arise in a model of re-
inforcement learning if agents have aspiration levels. By further exploring the implications of
reinforcement learning, we nd that probability matching still appears even in the absence of
aspiration levels. This suggests that the link between reinforcement learning and probability
matching is deeper than initially thought. Erev and Barron (2005) present an experimental
exercise where subjects exhibit probability matching behavior and show that reinforcement
learning is the behavioral model that better ts the data they observed. Therefore, our
theoretical exercise is supported by their ndings.
A fact worth mentioning is that no relationship between reinforcement learning and prob-
ability matching occurs in environments where the decision maker has no information about
counterfactuals (payos of not chosen actions). To our knowledge, this fact was rst ob-
served by Rustichini (1998), who showed that in environments where there is no information
about counterfactuals linear reinforcement learning results in the decision maker choosing
with probability one the action that is best in the long run.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
Consider a decision maker who every period t = 0;1;::: has to choose an action from the
nite set A = f1;:::;ng. The payo of the decision maker at time t depends on her action
and on the state of nature st 2 S = f1;:::;mg at time t unknown to the decision maker. If
the decision maker chooses action i and the state of nature equals s then her payo equals
is. To simplify the exposition, we assume that is 2 [0;1] and for any state s the payo
3maximizing action is unique. Dene s as the vector of payos of each action in state s,
s = (1s;:::;ns).
The sequence of states of nature fstgt follows an independent and identically distributed
process where ps 2 [0;1] is the probability of each state s occurring at any given t with
P
s ps = 11. An environment is dened by the payo vectors together with the probabilities
of each state occurring: f(1;:::;m);(p1;:::;ps)g.
Let t




i = 1 for all t. We assume 0
i is given for all i and lies between (0;1) so that
all actions have positive initial probability of being chosen. Finally, dene i = ft
igt.
The timing within each time period t goes as follows: First, the decision maker chooses
an action according to t
i for all action i. Second, nature decides the state. Third, payos
are realized and the decision maker observes the payo of all actions2. Finally, the decision
maker updates the probability of choosing each action t+1
i for all i.
2.2 The Learning Rule
The type of reinforcement learning we consider is such that the next period's likelihood of
choosing a given action is quasi-linear in the current likelihood of choosing that action and the
payo each action yielded. This implementation of reinforcement learning is a generalization
of the linear reinforcement learning models pioneered by psychologists Bush and Mosteller
(1951) and applied to economics rst by Simon (1959) and Cross (1973).
By ways of reinforcement, the decision maker increases the probability of choosing the
action that yielded a higher payo in the previous period. As argued above, we focus our at-
tention on a generalization of the most widely used implementation of reinforcement learning,
whereby the increase in the probability of choosing a given action next period is quasi-linear
in the probability of choosing that action in the current period and the payo of each action.
Let t+1
i (s) be the value of t+1
i if at period t the state of nature is s. We have the following
denition:















with  2 (0;1] and f : [0;1]n ! (0;1].
1In Rivas (2008) we show that when states of nature follow a Markov process results presented here are
still valid.
2For the case where foregone payos are not observed see Rivas (2008).
4The function f above can be seen as the intensity or strength of the reinforcement whilst
the parameter  is interpreted as the learning speed. The reason why  is not included in f
will be clear later on. The function f, as imposed by reinforcement, is weakly increasing in
the payo of the action that yielded the highest payo and weakly decreasing in the payo
of all the other actions. That is, f is weakly increasing (decreasing) in is if and only if
is > (<) is.






























Another possible specication of f includes the case where f(s) = 1 for all s. In this
situation, the resulting learning rule is equivalent to what is known in the population games
literature as the best response with inertia (see Samuelson (1994) or Kosfeld et al. (2002)).
Previous literature relating reinforcement learning and probability matching assumed
that f(s) = 1 and  = 1. In this case, the frequency with which each action is chosen
trivially converges to the frequency with which that action is the best choice. Allowing for a
much general specication permits us to better understand the relationship between the two
phenomena. In particular, as we shall show, under some circumstances convergence not only
occurs in the frequency by which each action is chosen but also in the probability of choosing
each action.
3 Results
3.1 Convergence in Frequencies
Our rst result is that under reinforcement learning the frequency with which each action
is chosen is closely related to the probability of that action being the best choice. This
relationship is given by the specic functional form of f used and is independent on the
parameter . Proposition 1 below states this nding formally.
Proposition 1. Dene E0 as the expected value operator evaluated at time 0. Furthermore,















Proof. The result follows directly from applying Breiman's strong law for Markov processes
(Breiman (1960)) to the sequence i for all action i. However, in order to improve exposition
we show a self-contained proof that uses the well known law of iterated expectations (see, for
instance, Ljungqvist and Sarget (2000)).












































with a = 1 
P
s psf(s) and b =
P
s:is> is psf(s). Therefore, using the law of iterated






































That is, the expected probability with which an action is chosen converges to the prob-
ability of that action being the best choice, corrected by the specic function f used and
6the payo vectors (1;:::;m). Previous literature relating reinforcement learning and








s:is> is ps. That is, the frequency with which an action is chosen
converges to the probability of that action being the best choice. This is what is known as
probability matching.
Proposition 1 generalizes on previous literature by allowing for a more general specication
of reinforcement learning. In section 3.3 we study whether or not this general specication
is able to select the best action in the long run.
3.2 Convergence in Probabilities
Apart from convergence in frequencies, we nd that converge in probabilities is also possible.
This means that not only the frequency with which each action is chosen converges but that
the probability with which each action is chosen also converges to the probability of that
action being a best choice.
The following proposition characterizes the convergence of i for all action i when learning
speed  is arbitrarily small.












Proof. We proceed by showing that for any " > 0, if  < " then limt!1 E0
 
t





"2. That is, t
i converges in 2-nd order mean when learning speed  converges to zero. In
other words, we proceed by showing that for any " > 0, if  < " then the variance of i is
bounded above by "2.































































+ b0 i   ( i)
2 + p(2) ()
where a0 = 1   2
P
s psf(s), b0 = 2
P
s:is> is psf(s) and p(2) : (0;1] ! (0;1] is a
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= ( i)
2   ( i)
2 + p(2) ()
= p(2) ()
 2:












i converges in 2-nd order mean when learning speed  converges to zero. As
convergence in r-th order mean with r > 1 implies converges in probability, we have that
t




when learning speed  is arbitrarily small. Since by




=  i, the result follows.
The intuition behind proposition 2 is that as learning speed parameter  becomes small,
the change in the probabilities of choosing each action also becomes small. In the limit this
means that the the variance of the stochastic process on i for all i collapses to zero. This
fact together with proposition 1 implies than on top of converges in frequencies converge in
probabilities also occurs.
If instead of a general function f we consider the case where f(s) = 1 for all s, we have
the following corollary:












  > "
1
A = 0:
That is, the probability of choosing action i converges to the probability with which that
action is a best response to the environment. This is a stronger result than that of probability
matching: not only there is convergency in frequencies but also in probabilities if learning
speed is suciently slow.
3.3 Optimality
We continue our analysis by formulating the following question: Is it possible to design an
specication of f such that the resulting probability of choosing the action that has the
8highest expected payo converges to 1? For understanding this issue we use the concept of
optimality:
Denition 2. We say that the quasi-linear reinforcement learning rule is optimal if there












with k = argmaxi
P
s:is> is psis.
A feature of reinforcement learning is that the decision maker can be \distracted" towards
non-optimal actions by the random process on the states of nature. This is because non-
optimal actions can be the best action for some states of nature. Therefore, randomness can
lead the decision maker to increase the probability of choosing a non-optimal action even if
she is currently choosing the optimal action with probability one. As a consequence, there are
environments such that for any rule the limit of the learning process converges to a situation
where non-optimal actions are chosen with some positive probability. This is formally proven
in our next proposition.
Proposition 3. The quasi-linear reinforcement learning rule is not optimal.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that k = argmaxi
P
s:is> is psis, so that action
k has the highest expected payo.
The proof goes by contradiction. Assume that for all " > 0 there exists a function f such
that for all the environments f(1;:::;m);(p1;:::;ps)g, j k  1j < ". This can be rewritten
as follows: for any sequence f"rg1
r=0 converging to 0 with "r > "r+1 > 0 for r 2 f0;:::;1g
and "0 given, we have that there exists an associated sequence of functions ff"rg1
r=0 with
f"r : [0;1]n ! [0;1] such that  k(f"r) <  k(f"r+1) with r 2 f0;:::;1g and
lim
n!1  k(f"r) = 1;
where  k(f"r) is the value of  k associated with the function f"r.









Take now an environment f(1;2);(p1;p2)g where 0 < 11 < 22 and 12 = 21 = 0.
We could consider more general environments but that will only complicate the exposition

















However, given that 11 < 22 and 12 = 21 = 0, we have that f"r(1)  f"r(2) for all
r > 0, a contradiction.
The logic behind the proof is that if the quasi-linear reinforcement learning rule is optimal
then there exists a function f that magnies the payos of each action. This can be seen
in equation (3), where the nite dierence in payos is magnied to innity. However, if
this is the case, an environment can be found such that there is a rare state of nature for
which the payo of the suboptimal action is greater than that of the optimal action. In
such environment, f cannot result in the decision maker choosing the optimal action with
probability one in the long run.
4 Conclusions
We studied the relationship between probability matching and reinforcement learning in an
environment where counterfactuals are observed and found that the two phenomena are
signicantly related. In particular, under a general class of reinforcement learning rules that
we called the quasi-linear reinforcement learning rule, the expected probability with which an
action is chosen converges to the probability of that action being the best choice, corrected
by the specic learning rule used and the payo vectors. Moreover, if the decision maker's
learning speed is suciently slow then convergence not only occurs in the frequency with
which each action is chosen but also in its probability. We concluded our results by showing
that this sub-optimality property of reinforcement learning is robust, meaning that it is not
possible to design an specication of quasi-linear reinforcement learning such that behavior
is optimal for all environments.
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